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4Executive Summary
In the first half of 2018, sugarcane productivity in Indonesia decreased by 2.56 tonnes/ha while 
the extraction rate fell by 0.36 percentage point compared to 2017. Meanwhile, the demand for 
sugar is growing steadily, as indicated by an increase in per capita consumption of more than 
22% from 2009 to 2017. The combination of lower productivity and higher demand contributes to 
high prices for white crystal sugar—the domestic price was nearly three times the international 
market price in August 2018. 
High prices impact both private consumers and the food and beverages (F&B) industry. They also 
affect agricultural workers in general because two-thirds of them are net food consumers paying 
these higher prices. Government programs to improve domestic productivity via regulations 
by the Minister of Agriculture (MOA) 53/2015 and Minister of Industry (MOI) 50/2012 have not 
achieved their intended results. 
The implementation of import quotas and limiting licenses to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
as stipulated in the regulation of the Minister of Trade (MOT) 117/2015, aggravates the situation. 
Restricting entry to the market through a non-transparent import licensing process contributes 
to Indonesia’s uncompetitive sugar market. As a result, imports cannot lower sugar prices to 
help the consumers in Indonesia. 
We propose a two-step policy reform to lower sugar prices that provides sufficient time for 
relevant stakeholders to adjust to the new policies. First, within five years, the government 
should revise MOT 117/2015 Article 5 (2) on import licensing to allow qualified private sector 
companies to import sugar. This revision must include a more transparent licensing process to 
prevent cartel practices by either SOEs or private importers. Consumers will enjoy more options 
when buying sugar thanks to the increasing number of importers. In this first stage of reform, 
the quantity of sugar imported will remain under government control to limit the impact of the 
reform on sugarcane prices for the domestic farmers. 
The first stage might be insufficient to address the competing goals of lowering sugar prices for 
consumers and keeping sugarcane prices high to protect farmers. This is why a second stage 
of reform is necessary. In the first ten years of reform, the government must provide support 
for restructuring the practices and upgrading the technology used by farmers and sugar milling 
factories. This support must be accompanied by a specific target for increased productivity. 
After these first ten years, the government should remove the import quota stipulated in MOT 
117/2015 Article 3, allowing imports to satisfy domestic market demand. This timeframe should 
provide sugarcane farmers and the national sugar industry with sufficient time to prepare for 
competition with imported sugar. These reforms will result in a more competitive sugar market 
with lower sugar prices for Indonesian consumers. 
5Current Situation
Indonesia’s central government classifies sugar as one of seven strategic food commodities, 
alongside rice paddy, maize, soybeans, poultry, chili, and beef (Ministry of Agriculture, 2015a, 
p. 2). Official statistics estimate that Indonesia’s sugar industry includes 746,037 farmers and 
267,931 laborers (Ministry of Agriculture, 2016b, p. 14). In 2016, the value of the industry was 
estimated at IDR 25 trillion or 0.20% of the total GDP of IDR 12,406 trillion (Statistics Indonesia, 
2016; GBG, 2016). The associated labor force and value of the sugar industry explain its strategic 
importance to the economy and the rural livelihood of Indonesians.
In 2017, sugar consumption in Indonesia reached 5.65 million tonnes, higher than neighboring 
countries such as Australia (1.20 million tonnes), the Philippines (2.20 million tonnes), and 
Thailand (2.67 million tonnes) (U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA], 2017-2018).1 Data from 
2018 shows that Indonesians consume 26.34 kg of sugar per year, more than in Vietnam (17.18 
kg/capita/year), India (19.26 kg/capita/year), and the Philippines (21.65 kg/capita/year).
Indonesia classifies sugar into three categories: raw sugar used for domestic sugar refining; 
refined sugar used by the medium and large-scale food and beverages (F&B) industry; and white 
crystal sugar used by regular households and small-scale F&B business units such as those 
who make cakes, biscuits, and syrups (Cicilia, 2018; Pujitiasih, Arifin, & Situmorang, 2014, p. 
34; USDA, 2017).2 The term sugar in this paper refers to the combination of all three categories 
unless otherwise stated.
While the regulation of the Minister of Industry (MOI) 10/2017 stipulates that all F&B industry 
businesses must use refined sugar, a minimum purchase quantity of one tonne per transaction 
means small-scale businesses are unable to comply with this requirement—on average, these 
businesses use less than 600 kg per year (APINDO, 2017). Instead, they rely on white crystal 
sugar that is more widely available in the consumer market.3
Compared to the other categories, white crystal sugar has the highest market price. It requires 
a longer production process than raw sugar and refined sugar. Furthermore, while white crystal 
sugar is mainly traded as a retail good, both raw and refined sugar are bought and sold in large 
quantities (e.g., the minimum purchase of one tonne), and so are sold at wholesaler prices. From 
2007 to 2017, the world price of white crystal sugar was consistently higher than the prices of 
raw and refined sugar (Figure 1).
1 1 tonne = 1 metric ton = 1,000 kilogram
2 Regulation of the Minister of Trade (MOT) 117/2015 Article 2 classifies all three types of sugar based on their International 
Commission for Uniform Methods of Sugar Analysis (ICUMSA) level. White crystal sugar has between 70 to 200 IU (International 
Units) ICUMSA; refined sugar has maximum 45 IU ICUMSA; and raw sugar has minimal 1,200 IU ICUMSA. The smaller the 
ICUMSA level, the whiter the sugar.
3 Up to April 2018, those who would like to purchase refined sugar had to do so through an auction system via the Jakarta 
Commodity Market coordinated by Commodity Futures Trading Regulatory Agency (Badan Pengawas Perdagangan Berjangka 
Komoditi / BAPPEBTI) under the Ministry of Trade as stipulated in MOT 16/2017 on Refined Sugar Trading. The Ministry annulled 
this regulation in April 2018 as recommended by the Anti-Corruption Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi / KPK), which 
deemed this regulation unfair for the small-scale industry. After that, the Ministry allowed businesses to purchase the refined 
sugar directly from the producers and/or importers. However, in June 2018, the Ministry revealed that they plan to re-enact 
this regulation and to strengthen it with a presidential regulation (Agustinus, 2018; Sutari, 2018; Yuniarta & Winarto, 2018). The 
Ombudsman Indonesia stated that the Ministry is allowed to do this as part of corrective measures to improve the auction system 
so it can benefit the small-scale industry (Ombudsman Indonesia, 2018).
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World Price of Raw, Refined, and White Crystal Sugar, 2007–2017 (IDR per kg)
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In August 2018, the national average white crystal sugar price in Indonesia reached IDR 
12,386 per kg (Statistics Indonesia, 2018b, p. 96), nearly three times the world price 
of IDR 4,591.48 in the same period (International Sugar Organization [ISO], 2018). The 
official socio-economic national survey recorded that national average white crystal 
sugar consumption per person in Indonesia reached 0.58 kg per month or 6.93 kg per 
year in 2017 (Statistics Indonesia, 2017c, p. 80).4 
At the end of 2017, the poverty line in Indonesia was set at IDR 370,910 per month 
(Statistics Indonesia, 2018). This means those who live at the poverty line spend nearly 
2% (IDR 7,183) of their monthly income on white crystal sugar,5 and those below the 
poverty line spend an even larger portion. By this calculation, a five-person household spends 
around IDR 35,000 for white crystal sugar every month and could have saved around IDR 22,000 
per month if they were paying world market price.6 At the same consumption level, an Indonesian 
household pays nearly IDR 7,000 more per month than a household of the same size in Malaysia. 
The price of white crystal sugar in Kuala Lumpur supermarkets is only IDR 10,038.63 per kg 
(Center for Indonesian Policy Studies [CIPS], 2018).7
4 This number represents white crystal sugar consumption only. It does not include sugary food and drinks nor artificial 
sweeteners.
5 This calculation assumes that each poor person spends the same amount of money to purchase the same amount of sugar as 
the national average.
6 Calculation  Indonesia vs World Prices  (IDR 12,386 – IDR 4,591.48) x 0.58 kg x 5 person = IDR 22,604.11
7 Calculation  Indonesia vs Malaysia  (IDR 12,386 – IDR 10,038.63) x 0.58 kg x 5 person = IDR 6,807.37
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7High sugar prices in Indonesia have both demand and supply side causes. On the demand side, 
sugar consumption is growing faster than the population (Figure 2). Between 2009 and 2017, 
Indonesia’s population grew by 10.30% or more than 24 million people. In the same period, sugar 
consumption increased by 35.29% or 1.08 million tonnes. Nationally, per capita consumption of 
sugar was 21.26 kg in 2009, which increased by 22.67% to 26.08 kg per person in 2017.
Figure 2
Population and Sugar Consumption Growth in Indonesia, 2009–2017
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On the supply side, domestic sugar production in Indonesia suffers from both on-farm 
and off-farm issues. On-farm, the productivity of sugarcane plantations is determined 
by land fertility, labor availability, irrigation systems, and the application of technology 
(Susila et al., 2005a). The productivity of sugarcane plantations in Indonesia reached 
only 68.29 tonnes/ha in 2017. This is lower than other sugar-producing countries 
like Brazil (68.94 tonnes/ha) and India (70.02 tonnes/ha) in the same period (US 
Department of Agriculture [USDA], 2018b, 2018a).8 
Off-farm, the extraction rate of sugar milling factories,9 which depends on sugarcane 
quality, the required cutting time, and the management quality of factory machinery 
(Purwono, 2003, p. 1), reached only 7.50% in 2017/2018 (US Department of 
Agriculture [USDA], 2017b, p. 2,3). This is lower than in neighboring countries such 
as the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia whose extraction rates reached 9.20%, 
10.70%, and 14.12% respectively. The age of sugarcane milling factories in Indonesia 
8 India is the largest sugar producer in Asia; Brazil is the largest sugar producer in the world (USDA 2018).
9 Extraction rate refers to the percent of sucrose obtained from processing sugar beets or sugarcane, compared 
to the sucrose content in the sugar beet or sugarcane before processing (USDA, 2018d)
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8contributes to their low extraction rate. Of 63 factories in the country, approximately 40 are over 
100 years old, and the oldest one is 184 years old (2017b, p. 4).
The age of sugarcane milling factories in Indonesia 
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country, approximately 40 are over 100 years old, and the 
oldest one is 184 years old
Meanwhile, consumer demand exceeds domestic sugar production in Indonesia. From 2009/2010 
to 2016/2017, average domestic sugar production was 2.01 million tonnes per year and imports 
reached 3.29 million tonnes (Figure 3). In the same period, average sugar consumption was 5.30 
million tonnes per year, matching the supply. Nevertheless, as Figure 3 shows, official statistics 
show that there were periods when sugar supply from domestic production and imports fell 
short of national consumption. For example, from 2014/2015 to 2016/2017, supply was 4.42% 
lower than consumption, creating an average deficit of 251,667 tonnes over those years.
Figure 3
Sugar Production, Imports, Consumption, and Surplus/Deficit in Indonesia, 2009–2017 (in 000 tonnes) 
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The Ministry of Trade reports that, on average, around 300,000 tonnes 
of refined sugar is traded illegally every year 
9According to those in the sugar industry, the deficit was caused by a lack of clarity about the 
quantity of remaining stock (before production and import) at the beginning of each time period 
(Former Representative of PT. RNI, 2018; Representative of PT. OI & PT. KTM, 2018).10 Refined 
sugar intended for industry use was siphoned into the consumer market and sold as white crystal 
sugar at the higher price of white crystal sugar. This illegal practice contributed to the lack of 
clarity in available data because it created “phantom stock” that was not recorded in the official 
statistics. The Ministry of Trade reports that, on average, around 300,000 tonnes of refined sugar 
is traded illegally every year (Idris, 2017; Primadhyta, 2017; Safutra, 2017). 
10 The name of interviewee remains anonymous for privacy reasons.
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Existing Policies
1. On-farm and off-farm policies
The Indonesian government has two ministerial regulations aimed at increasing domestic sugar 
productivity. The regulation of the Minister of Agriculture (MOA) 53/2015 focuses on improving 
on-farm practices by improving sugarcane cultivation techniques through the development of 
prime types of sugarcane varieties, estimation of the best planting periods, and dissemination 
of information about good planting practices. This regulation also works to ensure the welfare 
of sugarcane farmers and sugar milling factory workers by providing them with healthcare 
insurance, food and beverages, and, when necessary, medical treatments.
Off-farm, the government implements MOI 50/2012, which stipulates that the central government 
provide financial support for state-owned sugar milling factories to fully or partially replace 
and/or repair their machinery and provide technological upgrades as part of a revitalization 
program (Article 3 (1)). In 2018, the government allocated IDR 8.6 billion of the state budget to 
this program, along with revitalization of machinery for forestry and other plantation products, 
including timber and palm oil (Ministry of Industry, 2017, p. 67).
2. International trade policies
The Indonesian government imposes Minister of Trade (MOT) regulation 117/2015, which aims to 
use imports to stabilize sugar prices (Article 4). By implementing this regulation, the government 
controls the quantity of sugar imported and tries to maintain a difficult balance between affordable 
prices for consumers and profitable production for domestic sugar producers. Article 3 of the 
regulation stipulates that the quantity of imported sugar is determined through the ministerial 
coordination meeting. Meanwhile, Article 5 (2) states that sugar import licenses are reserved for 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with a General Importer Identification Number (API-U).
11
Analysis
Ideal Cultivation Practices for Sugarcane in Indonesia
According to the Good Agricultural Practices guideline published by the Ministry of Agriculture 
(2015b, p. 7), sugarcane in Indonesia can grow in either irrigated or rain-fed farmland. A majority 
(57%) of farmland is irrigated, while 36% is rain-fed type and the rest (7%) is river-based (Ministry 
of Agriculture, 2016a, pp. 9–10). For irrigated sugarcane plantations, planting is ideally conducted 
near the start of or during the dry season, between April and August.11 Ideal planting for rain-fed 
sugarcane takes place between September and November, near the end of dry season and up to 
the beginning of rainy season.12 
The harvest should be conducted at least 11 months after planting when sugarcane has reached 
a minimum height of two meters (Indrawanto, Purwono, Siswanto, Syakir, & Rumini, 2010, p. 9). 
During the harvest period, the less rainfall the better. High rainfall causes water to seep into the 
sugarcane stalk, reducing its sucrose content (Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries 
of South Africa, 2014, p. 21). 
On-Farm Situation 
After the implementation of MOA 53/2015 in October 2015, sugarcane productivity in Indonesia 
increased by 2.44% from 66.67 tonnes/ha in 2015/2016 to 68.29 tonnes/ha in 2016/2017 
(Figure 3). In 2017/2018, however, it decreased by 3.76% to 65.73 tonnes/ha. In spite of policy 
interventions, rather than increasing once the regulation was implemented, average productivity 
fell by 8.52%, from 73.13 tonnes/ha in 2008–2014 to 66.90 tonnes/ha in 2015–2018. 
Prolonged drought caused by El Nino13 contributed to falling productivity. In 2011/2012, 
productivity decreased by nearly 15%, from 78.24 tonnes/ha in the previous period to 66.67 
tonnes/ha (Figure 4), in part due to El Nino hitting the country from June to November 2012 
(Maulidiya, Ihwan, & Jumarang, 2012, pp. 6, 13, 14). Similarly, in 2014 and 2015 El Nino caused 
delays to the planting period. These delays decreased productivity by 11.74% from 74.89 tonnes/
ha in 2013/2014 to 66.10 tonnes/ha in 2014/2015 (USDA, 2014, p. 4, 2015, p. 5, 2016, p. 6). 
11 In normal conditions, the dry season in Indonesia runs from May to October (Meteorology, Climate, and Geophysics Agency 
[Badan Meteorologi Klimatologi dan Geofisika/BMKG], 2018b, p. 28).
12 In normal conditions, the rainy season in Indonesia runs from November to April (BMKG, 2018a, p. 30).
13 El Nino (literal meaning, “The Little Boy”) refers to the large-scale climate interaction between the ocean and the atmosphere 
that typically leads to warmer-than-average temperatures and drier-than-average conditions in various parts of the world for 
an extended period of time (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], 2018).
In spite of policy interventions, rather than increasing 
once the regulation was implemented, average 
productivity fell by 8.52%
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Figure 4
Sugarcane Productivity in Indonesia, 2009–2018 (tonnes/ha)
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In addition to the adverse impacts of weather, the unsuitability of the existing sugarcane varieties 
for current farm locations, insufficient manpower for proper sugarcane cultivation techniques, 
problematic distribution of fertilizer, and a lack of monitoring of the use of subsidized farming 
inputs also contributed to falling productivity (Ministry of Trade, 2014, p. 14) (Indonesia Investment 
Coordinating Board [Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal/BKPM], 2015, p. 39). In addition, the 
difficulty of obtaining farm land that is conveniently located near milling factories means that 
domestic sugar companies must rely on poor road infrastructure to transport their sugarcane 
harvest (Indonesian Refined Sugar Association, 2016). These circumstances have all contributed 
to the low success rate of on-farm improvement efforts stipulated in MOA 53/2015.
Off-Farm Situation
Despite government grants that offer financial support (as stipulated in MOI 50/2012), there has 
been no significant improvement to the age of sugar milling factories in Indonesia. Around 40 
of 63 factories are more than 100 years old (USDA, 2017, p. 4). The need to temporarily stop 
production during the repair and upgrading process, which may take as long as eight months 
to complete, may contribute to the reluctance of factory owners to accept the government’s 
grants (Asea Brown Boveri, n.d.). Furthermore, as shown in existing studies, major changes in an 
industry, including machinery upgrades, may disrupt the flow of work in affected organizations, 
unsettle businesses, and create uncertainty about their future operating earnings and cash flow 
(Lin, Lee, & Gibbs, 2008, p. 540); (Ahad, Hasan, Hoque, & Chowdhury, 2018, p. 34). During a similar 
transformation process in Poland, not all sugar companies were able to survive a capital upgrade 
process—only 18 of the 76 sugar refineries open in 2001 managed to survive to 2017 (Kotyza, 
Svatoš, Smutka, & Pawlak, 2018, p. 87).
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With only minimal improvements to sugar milling efficiency, the extraction rate in 
Indonesia depends heavily on the weather and is more vulnerable to the adverse 
impacts of extreme drought and prolonged rainy seasons (Figure 5). For example, in 
2013, Indonesia experienced a long rainy season that lasted until July. This delayed 
planting in irrigated lands and led to a decrease sugarcane sucrose content (USDA, 
2014, p. 4). As a result, in 2013/2014, the sugar extraction rate in Indonesia decreased 
by nearly a full percentage point from 7.70% in the previous year to 6.65%. At the same 
time, the extraction rate in the Philippines and Thailand increased by 0.32 and 0.88 
percentage point respectively. Similarly, in 2017/2018, when Indonesia experienced 
La Nina14 it both reduced the crop’s sucrose content and created complications in 
transporting the yield from the farmlands to the milling factories (USDA, 2017, p. 5). 
As a result, the extraction rate in Indonesia decreased by 0.36 percentage point from 
the previous period, while the Philippines and Thailand increased their extraction 
rates by 0.43 and 0.03 percentage point respectively. 
Today, the extraction rate in Indonesia (7.50%) is lagging behind the Philippines (9.20%) and 
Thailand (10.70%) by 1.70 and 3.20 percentage points respectively. If the three countries are to 
produce the same quantity of sugar, Indonesia needs to harvest 22.67% more sugarcane than 
the Philippines and 42.67% more sugarcane than Thailand.15 Since there is a 70% possibility of 
El Nino returning by the end of 2018 (World Meteorological Organization [WMO], 2018), the sugar 
extraction rate in Indonesia might take another hit in the near future.
Figure 5
Extraction Rate of Sugar Milling Factories in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, 
2009–2018 (%)
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14 La Nina (literal meaning, “The Little Girl”) refers to the periods when sea surface temperatures across the east-central 
Equatorial Pacific are lower than average, leading to weather anomalies such as increased rainfall and cooler-than-average 
temperatures (Australian Bureau of Meteorology [BOM], 2016; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], 2018).
15 For example, if Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand each need to produce one million tonnes of sugar, then Indonesia 
needs to harvest around 13.3 million tonnes of sugarcane, while the Philippines only need to harvest 10.8 million tonnes and 
Thailand only needs 9.3 million tonnes.
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Sugar Prices in the Domestic Market and the International Market
The government’s policies to improve domestic sugar productivity have not yielded the desired 
results. International trade offers an alternative route to lower sugar prices. The significance of 
international sugar prices to prices in the domestic market can be analyzed by observing the 
movement of both over a specific time period. 
From September 2010 to June 2018, changes in the world sugar price affected sugar prices in 
Indonesia’s domestic market. Most of the time they move in the same direction, both in the short 
term and the long term (Figure 6). In the short term, a 10% change on the international price 
corresponds with an instantaneous 6.10% change in the same direction on the domestic price. In 
the long term, a 10% change on the international price corresponds with a 1.3% change in the same 
direction on domestic sugar price.16 These calculations are explained in more detail in Annex I. 
Figure 6
Domestic and International Prices of Sugar, September 2010 – July 2018 (IDR per kg)
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Sources are collated from Statistics Indonesia (2010–2018), The World Bank (2010–2018), 
and X-Rates.com (2018)
In September 2010, the price of sugar in Indonesia reached IDR 10,599 per kg, more than twice 
the price on the international market of IDR 4,456 per kg. 
In August 2012, because of the increase of regulated minimum price for sugarcane farmers in 
India (Business Standard, 2012; The Economic Times, 2012; The Indian Express, 2012), sugar 
16 This means, when the international prices go up, the domestic prices will increase as well. On the other hand, when the 
international prices go down, the domestic prices will decrease, too. This applies to both short and long term, albeit at different 
percentage as explained in the text above. The other conditions are assumed to remain the same (ceteris paribus).
If the three countries are to produce the same quantity of sugar, 
Indonesia needs to harvest 22.67% more sugarcane than the 
Philippines and 42.67% more sugarcane than Thailand.
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prices in the international market rose to IDR 4,367 per kg, but it was still 1.98% cheaper than in 
September 2010. In the same period, sugar prices in Indonesia rose to IDR 12,828 per kg, 21.03% 
more expensive than in September 2010. 
In July 2016, the declining supply of sugar in the international market (ISO, 2016) led to an increase 
in the price to IDR 5,668 per kg, 27.2% higher than in September 2010. Domestically, though, the 
sugar price in Indonesia reached its peak at IDR 16,262 per kg, 53.43% than in September 2010. 
In June 2017, due to increased production in top sugar producing countries such India, China, and 
Thailand (USDA, 2017), sugar prices in the international market fell to IDR 4,077 per kg, 8.50% 
cheaper than in September 2010. In the same period, sugar prices in Indonesia also fell to IDR 
13,427 per kg, yet this was still 26.68% more expensive than the domestic price in September 2010. 
In July 2018, while sugar prices in Indonesia went down along with the price decrease in the 
international market, the price difference between them had grown 36.16% larger than it was in 
September 2010. 
These shifts and differences in price illustrate the correlation between sugar prices in Indonesia 
and the international market. In spite of this correlation, the domestic market is unable to take 
full advantage of falling international market prices when they occur. On the other hand, the 
domestic market is prone to sharp price increases when international prices rise.
MOT 117/2015, which regulates sugar imports, contributes to the inability of the 
domestic sugar market in Indonesia to take advantage of lower international 
sugar prices. This regulation renders the import mechanism ineffective because 
it allows the government to intervene in the market by restricting imports both 
via quota and by excluding the qualified private sector from sugar importation, 
thereby reducing the level of competition in the licensing process.
The import quotas granted by the government are not completely realized by the 
SOEs it licenses (Table 2). From 2012 to 2014, import realization decreased every 
year. Realization in 2014 was 9.78 percentage points lower than in the previous 
year. Importers argue that they sometimes receive licenses close to the domestic harvest period 
and are therefore concerned about triggering backlash from sugarcane farmers if they decide to 
import (Personal Interview, Former Representative of PT. RNI, 4 June 2018). 
Table 2
Sugar Import Quotas and Quota Realization in Indonesia, 2010–2014
Year Import Quota (tonnes) Realization (tonnes) Percentage of Realization (%)
2010 3,547,047 3,254,730 91.76%
2011 3,700,928 2,969,929 80.25%
2012 3,753,248 3,559,535 94.84%
2013 4,127,608 3,893,505 94.32%
2014 3,749,501 3,170,077 84.54%
Source: Ministry of Trade (2015, p. 104)
MOT 117/2015, which 
regulates sugar imports, 
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16
The lack of competition in the import licensing process is exacerbated by the 
fact that the government uses a non-transparent method to grant licenses (Anti-
Monopoly Commission [Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha/KPPU], 2010). The 
process creates oligopolistic competition17 in the sugar market since there are 
only three or four licensed importers in a given time period (Personal Interview, 
Head Of Research, Regulatory Analysis and Advocation Department, KPPU, 30 May 
2018; KPPU, 2010). These companies are free to control their supply to retailers 
and therefore they are also able to control sugar prices. This situation makes the 
sugar market prone to cartel practices in which the license-holding companies 
seek to collude and block the entry of new market players, stifling the competition 
and keeping sugar prices high for consumers.
Due to the uncompetitive sugar market, SOEs are able to keep their import licenses 
despite their ineffective import timing. When international prices were high, they 
repeatedly imported sugar in larger quantities compared to when the international prices 
were low (Figure 7). For example, when international price dropped to IDR 4,150.36 in January 
2014, SOEs imported only 213,273 tonnes, but in June 2014, when the international price rose 
by 14.77% to IDR 4,762.45, they more than doubled their import quantity to 437,134 tonnes. 
Similarly in 2016, when in January the international price was low, at IDR 4,294.37, only 142,250 
tonnes of sugar was imported. Two months later, when the international price rose by 4.26% to 
IDR 4,477.52, import quantity increased by nearly four times to 540,132 tonnes.
Figure 7
International Sugar Prices (IDR/kg) and Sugar Import Quantity (tonnes) in Indonesia,
September 2010–February 2018
International Prices (IDR/kg) Import Quantity (tonnes)
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Sources:
1. International Sugar Prices: The World Bank (2010–2018)
2. Sugar Import Volume: Statistics Indonesia: Foreign Trade Statistical Bulletin—Imports (2010–2018), including raw sugar (HS 
Code 1701.13.00.00 & 1701.14.00.00) and refined sugar (HS Code 1701.99.11.00)
17 Oligopolistic competition refers to a market structure in which only a small number of firms act as sellers. According to 
economic theory, these firms set prices not from the market, but by coordinating among themselves through collective effort or 
through the leadership of one firm. They are able to block new entrants, hinder innovation, and increase prices and this harms the 
consumers (Investopedia, 2018).
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Despite the large quantity of imports and in part because the sugar was imported 
while international prices were rising, domestic prices increased with imports, 
following the same trend as the international market (as explained in Figure 6 in 
the previous section). For example, while the amount of sugar imported more than 
doubled from May 2013 to June 2013 (263,646 tonne to 688,256 tonne), sugar prices 
slightly increased, by 0.17% (Rp12,367 to Rp12,388) rather than decreasing (Figure 
8). A similar case can be seen from April to June 2016. Import quantity more than 
doubled (183,199 tonne to 469,086 tonne) but sugar prices increased by 20.31% 
(Rp13,182 to Rp15,860). This illustrates that the uncompetitive licensing process 
leads to an uncompetitive market, which then leads to poor decisions regarding 
import timing and quantity and contributes to higher sugar prices for the consumers.
Figure 8
Sugar Prices in the Domestic Market (IDR/kg) and Sugar Import Quantity in 
Indonesia (tonnes), September 2010 – February 2018
Domestic Prices (IDR/kg) Import Quantity (tonnes)
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Studies show that uncompetitive markets resulting from limited market access for competing 
firms may lead to a reduction in consumer welfare stemming from high prices (Issa, 2017, p. 
664; Jørgensen & Schröder, 2006, p. 2). On the other hand, international experience shows that 
free trade between countries brought about various positive impacts. For example, the free trade 
agreement between Taiwan and Switzerland not only creates savings potential for importers on 
both sides, but also improves the framework of economic relations between the two countries 
(Ziltener, 2017, p. 135). 
In the sugar industry, bilateral free trade in sugar and sweeteners between Mexico and the 
United States (U.S.), established in 2008, has led to sugar market integration between the two 
countries. Integration has been accompanied by joint programs between the U.S. and Mexican 
The uncompetitive 
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leads to an 
uncompetitive 
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then leads to poor 
decisions regarding 
import timing 
and quantity and 
contributes to higher 
sugar prices for the 
consumers.
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governments in which they exchange, analyze, and publish up-to-date and transparent data on 
the sugar market. As a result, sugarcane farmers and sugar importers in both countries have 
access to reliable market information when conducting their respective businesses (Zahniser & 
Moreno, 2014, pp. 216–217). 
The Scenarios
Depending on what sugar trade policy that the government decides to pursue, there are four 
scenarios that could come about in the sugar market. These scenarios assume there is no 
significant improvement to either on-farm or off-farm productivity levels, which are explained in 
the previous section. 
Scenario I - Business as Usual
The first scenario is that the government maintains its existing policies. The trade restrictions 
stipulated in MOT 117/2015 Article 3 and Article 5 (2) prevent the import mechanism from 
lowering sugar prices. The impact of restrictive trade policies on consumer prices is measured 
using nominal rates of protection (NRP). NRP calculates the proportion by which domestic sugar 
producer prices exceed the prices of imported sugar at the country’s border due to trade policy 
(Marks, 2015, p. 10). 
The NRP for sugar reached 48.10% in 2015. This means the price of domestic sugar from 
sugarcane farmers in Indonesia is 48.10% more expensive than sugar from Thailand (or any 
international market) arriving for import at major Indonesian ports.18 Indonesian non-tariff trade 
policies, such as its non-transparent and uncompetitive licensing process, are responsible for 
more than 74% of the NRP value.19 
Meanwhile, since productivity levels remain the same, domestic sugarcane farmers are unable 
to improve their income through their farming activities, and since two-thirds of all farmers in 
Indonesia are net food consumers (McCulloch & Timmer, 2008, p. 35), high sugar prices have a 
negative impact on their ability to purchase sugar and other food items.
Scenario II - Eliminating Import Quotas Mechanism
The second scenario refers to the removal of the import quota stipulated in MOT 117/2015 
(Article 3) while the import licensing system stays the same. Licenses are only granted to the 
SOEs, as stated in Article 5(2). In this scenario, while there is no limitation on the quantity of 
sugar imported, import market competition will remain oligopolistic due to the limited number 
of importers. In these circumstances, the SOEs are able to control sugar prices by controlling 
the quantity of imported sugar. Consumers will still have limited options for buying sugar, the 
quantity of imported sugar may be insufficient to fulfil the deficit of domestic production when 
compared to demand, and sugar prices in Indonesia’s domestic market will remain higher than in 
the international market. These outcomes are similar to outcomes to those in the first scenario.
18 Including all expenses for Cost, Insurance, and Freight (CIF) required to bring the imported sugar from the producing country 
to Indonesia.
19 If the NRP on sugar only calculates the import tariffs and export taxes, its value would only reach 12.5%, or around 26% of 
the total NRP value.
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Scenario III - Revising Restrictive Import License
The third scenario is one in which import license policy as stipulated in MOT 117/2015 Article 5 
(2) is revised while the government remains in control of the sugar import quantity as stipulated 
in Article 3. In this scenario, import licenses would be granted not only to SOEs, but also to the 
qualified private sector. This means that import licenses would primarily serve for identification 
and not as a restriction to the market. 
This reform must focus on preventing cartel practices by either SOEs or private importers. It 
should do this by ensuring that the licensing process becomes more open, more transparent, and 
easier and faster to complete. This would make stock hoarding and price speculation less likely 
because importers will be subject to increasing competition. Eliminating cartel practices, stock 
hoarding, and price speculation would allow consumers to enjoy more options for sugar as the 
market supply comes from more importers. 
Since the government would still control the quantity of imported sugar in the market, the impact 
of imports on the income of domestic sugarcane farmers should be limited. On the other hand, 
maintaining the government’s interventions on the sugar supply might limit the ability of a more 
open and transparent licensing system to lower sugar prices for consumers, including the small-
scale sugarcane farmers who are net consumers.
Scenario IV - Eliminating the Import Quota System and Revising Restrictive Im-
port License
The fourth scenario refers to the most comprehensive reform to MOT 117/2015, in which the 
import licensing process (Article 5 (2)) is reformed and the import quota (Article 3) is removed. 
In this scenario, the impact of the revision to Article 5 (2) is the same as explained the third 
scenario. Meanwhile, the removal of import quota should allow the import mechanism to help the 
domestic market more fully adjust to the international market situation. These reforms would 
pave the way for imported sugar to enter the market more quickly and more effectively fill the 
deficit between domestic sugar supply and consumer demand. As a result, sugar prices should 
become lower for consumers. 
The NRP value for sugar, which reaches 48.10% under the current restrictions, suggests that 
more open trade has the potential to reduce sugar prices in the domestic market by nearly half 
of their current level.  
These reforms and their outcomes would also benefit around 67 million households20 who are 
net sugar consumers, since they do not work on sugarcane farms nor in the sugar industry. 
On the other hand, this situation might present difficulties for domestic sugarcane farmers and 
sugar milling factories, who would have to compete with imported sugar sold at cheaper prices.
All four scenarios mentioned above and their expected outcomes are presented in a matrix in 
Annex II.
20 The total population of Indonesia was 263,991,379 people (The World Bank, 2017b), while there were only 746,037 sugarcane 
farmers and 267,931 laborers (Ministry of Agriculture, 2016b, p. 14). The people who do not work as sugarcane farmers nor 
as sugar industry laborers are considered net sugar consumers. With an average size of 3.9 people per household, there 
were around 262,977,411 people, or approximately 67.43 million households, of net sugar consumers in Indonesia (Statistics 
Indonesia, 2017d, p. 86).
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Recommendations
Government policy to improve domestic sugar productivity as stipulated in MOA 53/2015 and 
MOI 50/2012 has not worked as intended, either on-farm or off-farm. Sugarcane productivity in 
2017/2018 was lower than in 2016/2017, and even lower than it was in 2008/2009. Meanwhile, 
the extraction rate of sugar milling factories has not improved significantly since 2008 and 
has lagged behind the Philippines and Thailand. Meanwhile, import restrictions stated in MOT 
117/2015 contribute to the uncompetitive nature of the sugar market in Indonesia, especially 
the import licensing process. All of these factors contribute to high sugar prices in Indonesia, 
in which white crystal sugar was nearly three times more expensive than in the international 
market in August 2018. 
Based on the scenarios projected in the previous section, we propose a two-stage policy reform 
to lower sugar prices while providing sufficient time for the relevant stakeholders to adjust to 
the new policies. 
First, in the first five years of reform the government should implement the third 
scenario, in which they revise MOT 117/2015 Article 5 (2) on import licensing, 
opening sugar importation not only to SOEs but also to the qualified private 
sector. This revision must emphasize creating a more transparent and fair 
licensing process to prevent cartel practices by either SOEs or private importers. 
Once these reforms are in place, companies will be unlikely to hoard stock and 
speculate on prices as they face increasing competition with a larger number of 
importers. As for consumers, they will have more options when buying sugar as 
the supply comes from an increasing number of importers.
While implementing these reforms, the government should keep its control over 
the quantity of imported sugar as stipulated in MOT 117/2015 Article 3. So long as 
government control over import quantities remains strong, reform of the licensing process will be 
met with minimum resistance from domestic sugarcane farmers and the domestic sugar industry. 
This will make reform less challenging to implement and make it possible to garner support from 
both the public and members of legislature. 
The second stage of reforms is related to the policy dilemma faced by the government when it comes 
to sugar prices: if prices fall, domestic farmers might suffer, but if prices keep increasing, consumers 
will suffer. Opening up imports as mentioned in the first stage of this reform is not sufficient to solve 
this dilemma. Therefore, the farmers and milling factories need to receive substantial support during 
the early part of the second stage of reforms to prepare them for its remaining process. 
In the first ten years of reform, the government must assist farmers and local sugar milling 
factories in restructuring farming practices and investing in better technology. This assistance 
must be given with a clear and specific target for productivity increases and extraction rate 
improvement in accordance with the government’s objectives for on-farm and off-farm programs. 
Without such a target, programs might fail yet again and as a result sugar prices will further rise 
and hurt consumers.  
First, in the first five 
years of reform the 
government should 
revise MOT 117/2015 
Article 5 (2) on import 
licensing, opening sugar 
importation not only 
to SOEs but also to the 
qualified private sector.
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In the first ten years of reform, the government must assist 
farmers and local sugar milling factories in restructuring 
farming practices and investing in better technology. 
After ten years, the government should implement the fourth scenario, which is in addition to 
revising the import licensing process as in the first stage of reforms, it also should remove the 
import quota stipulated in MOT 117/2015 Article 3 and allowing import quantities to be determined 
by market supply and demand. This timeframe should give sufficient time for the government 
to implement both on-farm and off-farm programs to increase productivity, extraction rate, and 
the overall quality of domestic sugar industry. This will mean that sugarcane farmers and the 
national sugar industry should be better prepared to compete with imported sugar. As long as 
the on-farm and off-farm programs start showing positive results within this timeframe, the 
government should be able to minimize resistance to this reform from domestic sugarcane 
farmers and sugar milling factories. 
After ten years, the government should remove the 
import quota stipulated in MOT 117/2015 Article 
3 and allow import quantities to be determined by 
market supply and demand.
Most importantly, consumers will enjoy the benefit of a more competitive sugar market that will 
lower sugar prices. As detailed in the fourth scenario, more open trade in imported sugar could 
potentially reduce sugar prices in the consumers market by nearly half of its current level.  
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Annex I
Analysis of sugar prices in Indonesia and in the international market, and also sugar prices in 
Indonesia and Sugar Volume Import
A. Data Source and Data Period
This paper combines the qualitative method and the quantitative method. For the quantitative 
method, we used error correction models (ECM). An ECM is a dynamic model in which the 
movement of the variables in any period is related to the previous period’s gap from long-run 
equilibrium (cointegrated). Furthermore, if the series is cointegrated and the ECM validated, then 
it will encompass any other dynamic specification—such as the partial adjustment mechanism.
We analyze the relationship between the logarithm (log) of domestic retail price (which is the 
same as consumer price, PD) of the food items in Indonesia expressed in Rp/kg; the log world 
price for same food items (PW) expressed in USD/kg; and also log import volume (Volimpor) 
expressed in tonne, while controlling for movements expressed in Indonesian Rupiah/US Dollar 
exchange rates (ER), also in logarithm form. All logarithms are natural. 
The average monthly data on retail prices (PD), ceiling price monthly data, and Sugar Import 
Volume monthly data were obtained from sources such as Statistics Indonesia (2017a) and 
Ministry of Trade. The data are from September 2010 until February 2018 (90 observations). 
World prices (PW) were obtained from the (World Bank, 2017) Database (The Pink Sheet) for the 
same period. The nominal rupiah/dollar exchange rates (ER) were obtained from the (X-Rates, 
2017) Converter Exchange Rates for same period.
The first step in the ECM model entails estimating a long-run relationship between domestic 
prices (PD) and world prices (PW) while controlling for foreign exchange rates (ER) using two-
step method (Engle & Granger, 1987), called symmetric ECM test. According to this approach, if 
the variables are cointegrated of the same order, then for those variables integrated of order one 
(I(1)) with a cointegration relation of the form as in equation (1):
   (1)
would produce a stationary  term (error term/residuals) after estimating this equation with an 
OLS (ordinary least square) procedure, where α and β are estimated parameters. If the residuals 
of equation (1) are stationary, then an error correction mechanism exists.
Second, the ECM is specified by using lagged residuals from the cointegrating regression in 
equation (1) as error correction terms (ECT) and using ∆ as the difference indicator (differencing 
means subtracting  from ) as follows in equation (2):
    (2)
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B. Preliminary Findings
As shown in Figure 9, in September 2010, the price of sugar in Indonesia reached IDR 10,599 
per kg, more than twice the price on the international market of IDR 4,456 per kg. In August 
2012, sugar prices in the international market rose to IDR 4,367 per kg, but it was still 1.98% 
cheaper than in September 2010. In the same period, sugar prices in Indonesia rose to IDR 
12,828 per kg, 21.03% more expensive than in September 2010. In July 2016, international 
price increased to IDR 5,668 per kg, 27.2% higher than in September 2010. Domestically, 
though, the sugar price in Indonesia reached its peak at IDR 16,262 per kg, 53.43% than in 
September 2010. In June 2017, sugar prices in the international market fell to IDR 4,077 per 
kg, 8.50% cheaper than in September 2010. In the same period, sugar prices in Indonesia also 
fell to IDR 13,427 per kg, yet this was still 26.68% more expensive than the domestic price in 
September 2010. In July 2018, while sugar prices in Indonesia went down along with the price 
decrease in the international market, the price difference between them had grown 36.16% 
larger than it was in September 2010.   
Figure 9
Domestic and International Prices of Sugar, September 2010 – July 2018 (IDR per kg)
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Sources are collated from Statistics Indonesia (2010–2018), The World Bank (2010–2018), and X-Rates.com (2018)
In addition, as shown in Figure 10, in some periods there was an increase of sugar import volume 
that was not followed by the decrease of domestic sugar price. The sugar import volume rose 
significantly from 263,646 tonnes in May 2013 to 688,256 tonnes in June 2013. Unfortunately, it 
did not affect the sugar market price as it rose from Rp12,388 to Rp12,390 in the same period. 
This was only one example in which prices rose when the import volume was also increasing.
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Figure 10
Relationship between Sugar Import Volume and Domestic Sugar Price
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As shown in Equation 1 results below, in the long run, a 10% change in the world price of sugar 
corresponds with instantaneous 1.3% change in the same direction in domestic sugar price, 
ceteris paribus.
(***): denotes significance at 1% confidence level| (*): denotes significance at 10% confidence level
And as shown in Equation 2 results below, in the short run, a 10% change in the world price of 
sugar corresponds with 6.1% change in the same direction on the domestic price, ceteris paribus, 
vice versa. 
(***): denotes significance at 1% confidence level | (*): denotes significance at 10%
confidence level.
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Annex II
Table 3. Scenario of Recommendations for Sugar Trade Policy
Sugar Price Stays High (consumer level)
Supply 
shortage
1. Business as Usual 
The quantitative analysis shows that 
import volume is not related to the price 
formed at the consumer level. High prices 
and a shortage of sugar supply occurred 
throughout the year 
---------------------------------------------------
• Sugar price stays high (consumer level)   
• Shortage of sugar supply
• Oligopolistic market
• Assuming no change in sugar 
productivity, the 2/3 of total farmers who 
are net food consumers will be affected 
by the high price of sugar
2. Eliminating Import Quotas Mechanism 
This refers to eliminating import quota while the 
government continues to limit the number of sugar 
importers. This condition limits the number of market 
players and the selected importers are able to control 
prices. 
---------------------------------------------------------------
• Sugar price stays high (consumer’s level)   
• Shortage of sugar supply
• Oligopolistic market
• Assuming no change in sugar productivity, the 2/3 
of total farmers who are net food consumers will be 
affected by the high price of sugar 
Supply 
shortage
3. Revising Restrictive Import License 
Revising restrictive import license 
mechanism refers to allowing private 
sector—and not only SOEs—to import 
sugar while keeping the quota mechanism. 
Consumers will have more choices of sugar 
from different importers. This scenario is 
recommended for short-term reform (up to 
five years). 
---------------------------------------------------
• Sugar price is relatively affordable
• Shortage of sugar supply
• More choices  Market becomes more 
competitive
• Assuming no change in sugar 
productivity, around 2/3 of total farmers 
who are net food consumers will benefit 
from more affordable sugar prices
4. Eliminating the Import Quota Import System and 
Revising Restrictive Import License 
This is the combination of scenarios 2 and 3, which 
focuses on less government intervention and more 
market mechanisms. This scenario is more viable after 
the implementation of scenario 3 and within 5 to 10 
years, assuming the government programs to improve 
on- and off-farm productivity start showing their results. 
----------------------------------------------------------------
• Sugar price is affordable  
• Minimum occurrence of sugar supply shortage 
• Competitive market 
• With the assumption there will be an improvement 
in sugar productivity, extraction rate, and the 
overall quality of domestic sugar industry, then the 
domestic producers can compete in the market
Minimum 
supply 
shortage
Sugar prices trend down (consumer level) 
Source: CIPS data analysis, 2018
*sugar = combination of raw, refined, and white crystal sugar unless otherwise stated
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